Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)

Jana Iyengar <> Tue, 21 January 2020 22:56 UTC

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From: Jana Iyengar <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)
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janaiyengar approved this pull request.

> +addresses. Such an attack is indistinguishable from the functions performed by a
+#### Parameter Negotiation
+The entire handshake is cryptographically protected, with the Initial packets
+being encrypted with per-version keys and the Handshake and later packets being
+encrypted with keys derived from the TLS key exchange.  Further, parameter
+negotiation is folded into the TLS transcript and thus provides the same
+security guarantees as ordinary TLS negotiation.  Thus, an attacker can observe
+the client's transport parameters (as long as it knows the QUIC version-specific
+salt) but cannot observe the server's transport parameters and cannot influence
+parameter negotiation.
+Connection IDs are unencrypted but integrity protected in all messages.  They
+are not incorporated in the TLS handshake transcript.

I think this second sentence can be dropped.

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