Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)

Eric Kinnear <notifications@github.com> Sat, 16 November 2019 12:44 UTC

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Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2019 04:44:34 -0800
From: Eric Kinnear <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)
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erickinnear commented on this pull request.



> +
+However, an attacker can modify the boundaries between QUIC packets and UDP
+datagrams, causing multiple packets to be coalesced into a single datagram, or
+splitting coalesced packets into multiple datagrams.  Such modification has no
+functional effect on a QUIC connection, however it might change the performance
+characteristics exhibited by the receiving endpoint.
+
+A spoofing attack, in which an attacker rewrites unprotected parts of a QUIC
+packet such as the source or destination address, is only effective if the
+attacker can forward packets to the original endpoint, as path validation
+({{migrate-validate}}) ensures that an endpoint's ability and willingness to
+decrypt QUIC packets is demonstrated before sending significant amounts of data
+to a new endpoint as part of an established QUIC connection.
+
+
+##### On-Path Active Attacks

Looking at this in more detail, it looks like we can move much of the definition to the beginning of the whole section, which leaves this part to be much smaller and less nested. :)

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