Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)

MikkelFJ <> Wed, 11 March 2020 17:01 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id C0D1D3A0DB8 for <>; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:01:56 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.696
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.696 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key)
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id d8uCbDw2Zt6v for <>; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:01:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( []) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2A5FC3A0DC9 for <>; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:01:53 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 477AF1C271C for <>; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:01:51 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;; s=pf2014; t=1583946111; bh=+JPotkAwVHSOb3+E0FGE5qBr8Hqgs+J21QOfJ+Gt6QU=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=HhiSvb+ZtEOd6ffCRTvtqX6NtCiJKQsu9CimvsfjrcPdrkQ7zMlDuDLHn9tyfSSEa FMviKfAOUZK02Ab4YEO+I5n2wiJVmzbFfIiHAwZGD3kzqS88S/sNgaKEF8wHXEup0j lmJ046Kwwb41VJCrwOyGSm5X6LMPMtCExyRw2vXU=
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:01:51 -0700
From: MikkelFJ <>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <>
Cc: Subscribed <>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2925/review/>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5e69197f3a5fa_1dce3f94760cd95c764c"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: mikkelfj
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
Archived-At: <>
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 17:01:57 -0000

mikkelfj commented on this pull request.

> +Computing the server's first flight for a full handshake is potentially
+expensive, requiring both a signature and a key exchange computation.  In order
+to prevent computational DoS attacks, QUIC incorporates a cheap token exchange
+mechanism which allows servers to validate a client's IP address prior to doing
+any expensive computations at the cost of a single round trip.  After a
+successful handshake, servers can issue new tokens to a client which will allow
+new connection establishment without incurring this cost.
+#### On-Path Handshake Termination
+An on-path attacker can force the QUIC handshake to fail by replacing either the
+client or server Initial messages with invalid messages.  An off-path attacker
+can also mount this attack by racing the Initials.  Once valid Initial messages
+have been exchanged, the remaining handshake messages are protected with the
+handshake keys and an on-path attacker cannot force handshake failure, though
+they can produce a handshake timeout by dropping packets.

The on path attacker can also submit a MITM attack on the handshake.

You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: