Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Request to Retire Locally Issued CIDs (#2769)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Tue, 11 June 2019 17:34 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Request to Retire Locally Issued CIDs (#2769)
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> @mikkelfj In general, each CID is associated with its own reset token. This allows for a straightforward stateless implementation of a stateless reset token generator. I don't think it would be a good idea to revisit that principle.

This is true, but the text currently allows for the SRTs associated with various CIDs to be identical.  This becomes problematic if you're forcing retirement and want to stop recognizing some of the CIDs previously issued.  However, that's a problem we already have and cover in the text:

> The same Stateless Reset Token MAY be used for multiple connection IDs on the same connection. However, reuse of a Stateless Reset Token might expose an endpoint to denial of service if associated connection IDs are forgotten while the associated token is still active at a peer. An endpoint MUST ensure that packets with Destination Connection ID field values that correspond to a reused Stateless Reset Token are attributed to the same connection as long as the Stateless Reset Token is still usable, even when the connection ID has been retired. Otherwise, an attacker might be able to send a packet with a retired connection ID and cause the endpoint to produce a Stateless Reset that it can use to disrupt the connection, just as with the attacks in Section 21.8.

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