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[TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Post-quantum Hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key Agreement for TLSv1.3

Jan Schaumann <jschauma@netmeister.org> Mon, 13 October 2025 17:56 UTC

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Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 13:56:08 -0400
From: Jan Schaumann <jschauma@netmeister.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Post-quantum Hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key Agreement for TLSv1.3
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Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:
> This is the working group last call for Post-quantum hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key
> Agreement for TLSv1.3. Please review draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem [1] and
> reply to this thread indicating if you think it is ready for publication or
> not.

I think the document should move forward, but I would
favor marking X25519MLKEM768 as Recommended=Y.

(Given that P-256 and P-384 are each marked
Recommended=Y on their own, I also think it'd be
reasonable to mark the hybrid SecP256r1MLKEM768 and
SecP384r1MLKEM1024 as Recommended=Y.

That is, I don't think I can follow a logic that says
X25519MLKEM768 should be recommended, but not the
others (unless one were to imply that standalone P-256
and P-384 should not be recommended).

But solving the question of these two variants needn't
hold up progress.)

-Jan

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