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Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 07 April 2022 14:41 UTC

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Date: Thu, 07 Apr 2022 10:40:52 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/GPjcN3XkFgoeosmpkD5NqQDZyUc>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice
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On Thu, 7 Apr 2022, Masataka Ohta wrote:

> As I wrote:
>
>>>  Such an individual would have to get access, create the records, give
>>>  them to others, who then have to on-path attack you. At the TLD level
>>>  and higher, this involves HSMs and physical access restrictions using
>>>  a “four eyes minimum” approach.
>
>>  Not surprisingly, diginotar was equally strongly secure.
>
> Are there anyone who still think DNSSEC were cryptographically secure
> or had protected TLDs more securely than diginotar?

Yes, everyone but you who participated in this thread.

Paul

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