Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice

Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Thu, 07 April 2022 15:56 UTC

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From: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Cc: "dnsop@ietf.org WG" <dnsop@ietf.org>
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References: <57f1c37b-497c-e1a0-329c-4b9c8b7e197b@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> <A9F689C9-4ABF-4947-AA6B-56E2F0C17D13@nohats.ca> <9732682e-78e7-f6bf-84fc-685de22d5e12@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> <350d8ab8-0477-b656-8b08-56f7561a7fda@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> <860d0d0-281e-b8c9-4169-5998a95a581f@nohats.ca> <00501a4b-0e47-e25e-2791-d0b80a416793@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Date: Thu, 07 Apr 2022 17:56:04 +0200
In-Reply-To: <00501a4b-0e47-e25e-2791-d0b80a416793@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> (Masataka Ohta's message of "Fri, 8 Apr 2022 00:01:02 +0900")
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice
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Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> writes:

> Are there anyone who still think, with reasons, DNSSEC were
> cryptographically secure or had protected TLDs more securely
> than diginotar?

Does DNSSEC make the TLD operators less trustworthy in your eyes?


Bjørn