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Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Mon, 21 March 2022 06:22 UTC

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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 07:22:14 +0100
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To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice
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On Mar 21, 2022, at 07:10, Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> wrote:
> 
> 
> Constructive thing to do to make DNS secure is to totally abandon
> DNSSEC and rely on DNS cookie or something like that.


DNS cookies provide no data origin security, only a weak transport security against non-onpath attackers.

A replacement suggestion for DNSSEC would need a bit more specification than “cookie or something like that”. It would not only need to cover what DNSSEC protects against, but also be worth the pain of a worldwide migration. An internet draft for this would be a good starting point for a discussion.

Paul

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