Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice

[Paul Wouters <[e-mail]>]

Okay,

I tried to substantiate the discussion but all I get back are unsubstantiated one line claims. I tried to ask for clarifications with details but didn’t receive these. If you can’t or won’t provide details, I cannot evaluate your claims and can take no action other than to reject your claims. If you can substantiate this in the future, I am happy to pick up this discussion.

Regards,

Paul

> 
> On Mar 21, 2022, at 15:12, Masataka Ohta <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Paul Wouters wrote:
> 
>> "Using a rogue AS known as AS9457, on February 3, the attackers
>> began advertising that they owned the IP addresses that served
>> developers.kakao.com,"
> 
> It is as easy as compromising developers.kakao.com.
> 
>> You can define every technical hack as a social problem because it
>> involved humans.
> 
> Yup.
> 
>>> The problem of DNSSEC, or PKI in general, is that, assuming such attacks, it is equally easy to socially compromise a zone with DNSSEC signature.
>> Yet that has never happened, unlike BGP attacks.
> 
> You miss my point that DNSSEC to produce correct IP addresses
> is powerless against BGP attacks.
> 
>>> It's pretty easy to forge certificates.
>>> Never rely on untrustworthy TTPs.
>> Yet I don’t hear you say to abandon TLS ?
> 
> TLS is no better than DH, which is subject to MitM attacks,
> though you might hear it from me for the first time.
> 
>>> Because security by PKI including DNSSEC is not end to end
>> With TRRs in browsers like Firefox, it practically is.
> 
> Wrong.
> 
> Because it is not end to end, it is subject to MitM attacks
> on software distribution chain.
> 
>>> Or, can you improve DNSSEC to instantly invalidate compromised
>>> zone information, which is impossible with slowly acting CRLs.
>> DNSSEC has no CRLs, only TTLs. I think you meant PKI here, not
>> DNSSEC?
> 
> That CRLs are very slow to react against attacks because
> PKI is not end to end makes CRLs totally useless for
> PKIs including DNSSEC, which is why I stated "instantly
> invalidate".
> 
>>>> Socially, having long enough message IDs is as secure as DNSSEC.
>> “Socially” makes no sense from a protocol level.
> 
> BCP is not at the protocol level.
> 
> 
>>>> That is because authors of the original specification of DNSSEC
>>> ignored my comments
>> It was not ignored, it was rejected.
> 
> It was ignored and rejected but later, with some implementation
> efforts, was recognized resulting in specification changes in
> the worst possible way, because recognition occurred to late.
> 
> So?
> 
> > Please submit a draft with enough details for an implementer and/or
> > sample code so the IETF can objectively evaluate your claims.
> 
> No implementation or code is necessary to say DNSSEC is
> fundamentally hopeless.
> 
>                        Masataka Ohta
> 
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