Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice

David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> Mon, 21 March 2022 17:54 UTC

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From: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
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Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 10:53:50 -0700
In-Reply-To: <59fdc791-4482-141b-03b4-bc27e8824f31@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Cc: DNSOP@ietf.org
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice
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On Mar 21, 2022, at 1:01 AM, Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> wrote:
> Paul Wouters wrote:
> 
>>>  Constructive thing to do to make DNS secure is to totally
>>> abandon DNSSEC and rely on DNS cookie or something like that.
> 
>> DNS cookies provide no data origin security, only a weak transport
>> security against non-onpath attackers.
> 
> If a resolver correctly knows an IP address of a nameserver of a
> parent zone and the resolver and the nameserver can communicate
> with long enough ID, the resolver can correctly know an IP
> address of a nameserver of a child zone, which is secure enough
> data origin security.

No.

https://therecord.media/klayswap-crypto-users-lose-funds-after-bgp-hijack/ <https://therecord.media/klayswap-crypto-users-lose-funds-after-bgp-hijack/>
https://www.theregister.com/2018/04/24/myetherwallet_dns_hijack/ <https://www.theregister.com/2018/04/24/myetherwallet_dns_hijack/>
Etc.

Securing the channel of communication != securing the data communicated via that channel.

Regards,
-drc