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Re: [DNSOP] Is DNSSEC a Best Current Practice?

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 10 March 2022 19:04 UTC

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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 14:04:44 -0500
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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Is DNSSEC a Best Current Practice?
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Sounds good to me.

Even better if we would clarify DNSSEC is not an optional part of DNS, but I don’t think you are volunteering for that discussion 😀

Sent using a virtual keyboard on a phone

> On Mar 10, 2022, at 13:54, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> wrote:
> 
> Greetings again. My motivation here is kinda trivial, but I've heard it is a common complaint. When writing a about DNSSEC, I need to reference the RFC. But it's three RFCs (4033, 4034, and 4035), and possibly another (6840). It would be awfully nice to refer to "DNSSEC" with a single reference like "BCP 250".
> 
> To get there, we need to update the RFCs and say that we want an BCP. This is mostly a paperwork exercise, but this WG isn't terribly good at getting those done. Maybe we could create a short-lived WG for moving DNSSEC to BCP that just the DNSSEC-y people need to pay attention to. If we do it, that WG would not take up any new DNSSEC-related work, just spruce up the base RFCs.
> 
> In the big picture, I think it would be good for the DNS to be able to refer to DNSSEC more easily. Thoughts?
> 
> --Paul Hoffman_______________________________________________
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