Re: Update of RFC 2606 based on the recent ICANN changes ?

Douglas Otis <dotis@mail-abuse.org> Tue, 08 July 2008 04:18 UTC

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From: Douglas Otis <dotis@mail-abuse.org>
To: John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>
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Subject: Re: Update of RFC 2606 based on the recent ICANN changes ?
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 21:18:18 -0700
References: <20080707171926.28210.qmail@simone.iecc.com> <F8F3EE48494D3E281D901830@p3.JCK.COM>
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On Jul 7, 2008, at 10:49 AM, John C Klensin wrote:
> --On Monday, 07 July, 2008 17:19 +0000 John Levine
> <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:
> John,
>
> While I find this interesting, I don't see much logical or  
> statistical justification for the belief that, if one increased (by  
> a lot) the number of TLDs, the amount of "invalid" traffic would  
> remain roughly constant, rather than increasing the multiplier.
>
> And, of course, two of the ways of having "networks [to] clean up  
> their DNS traffic" depend on local caching of the root zone (see  
> previous note) and filtering out root queries for implausible  
> domains.  Both of those are facilitated by smaller root zones and  
> impeded by very large ones.

Agreed.  This is happening while some email providers suggest  
widespread adoption of MX resource records targeting roots to signify  
opting-out.  Not only does this form of email opt-out unfairly burden  
the victim, this scheme also victimizes roots.  Are roots really  
inexhaustible and capable of sustaining high levels of horizontal  
growth, and ever greater levels of DNS misuse while adopting an  
additional security layer?  How will roots be able to block abuse once  
it proves destructive?

 From the human aspect, the list of common file extensions is mind- 
numbingly long.  With a changing TLD landscape, one will no longer be  
sure whether a reference is to a file or to an Internet host.  This  
becomes critical since automation is often used to fully construct  
links.  Will obvious names be precluded such as .C0M, or those less  
obvious having international domain names?  While this might help  
ICANN raise money, their profit seems destine to come at the expense  
of those currently supporting existing infrastructure.  If domain  
tasting is an example of governance, then how can ICANN be trusted to  
operate in the greater interest of the Internet?  It seems more  
reasonable to extend ccTLDs into a comparative list of international  
domain names where desired, and then wait a decade to measure its  
impact and to allow wider deployment of DNSsec.

Smaller steps rather faith in ever greater capacity seems more  
appropriate.  If DNS were to approach the ability of roots to respond,  
then DDoS attacks take on truly global proportions.

-Doug


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