Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to savingthe Internet from the NSA

John C Klensin <john@jck.com> Fri, 06 September 2013 15:46 UTC

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Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 11:45:48 -0400
From: John C Klensin <john@jck.com>
To: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to savingthe Internet from the NSA
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--On Friday, September 06, 2013 10:43 -0400 Joe Abley
<jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:

>> Can someone please tell me that BIND isn't being this stupid?
> 
> This thread has mainly been about privacy and confidentiality.
> There is nothing in DNSSEC that offers either of those,
> directly (although it's an enabler through approaches like
> DANE to provide a framework for secure distribution of
> certificates). If every zone was signed and if every response
> was validated, it would still be possible to tap queries and
> tell who was asking for what name, and what response was
> returned.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to me that
DANE-like approaches are significantly better than traditional
PKI ones only to the extent to which:

	- The entities needing or generating the certificates
	are significantly more in control of the associated DNS
	infrastructure than entities using conventional CAs are
	in control of those CAs.
	
	- For domains that are managed by registrars or other
	third parties (I gather a very large fraction of them at
	the second level), whether one believes those registrars
	or other operators have significantly more integrity and
	are harder to compromise than traditional third party CA
	operators.

best,
   john