Re: [mpls] Last Call: <draft-ietf-mpls-in-udp-04.txt> (Encapsulating MPLS in UDP) to Proposed Standard

[Curtis Villamizar <[e-mail]>]

In message <[e-mail]>
[e-mail] writes:
 
> Curtis,
>  
> the 'intended for use within a service provider' and not for mass use
> sounds reasonable, and scoping in this way may also alleviate some
> congestion control concerns.

Partial agreement.  That's progress.

> But outgoing packet filtering, when you're trying to catch a corrupted
> port, and the port is not what you think it is? That's going to do a
> partial job of corrupted addresses in IPv6 at best. (v4 has header
> checksums, ports in v4 and v6 are open to corruption sans UDP
> pseudo-header check.)


Both the port and the IPv6 address would have to be corrupt for the
filter to fail.

> Not convinced by providers already blocking inbound traffic on a new
> port - particularly given discussion of handling entropy with varying
> ports in another thread.

Providers already block port 179 and quite a few others and have for
20 years.  If the provider wants the service to simply not affect
their infrastructure, the filter is dest port number plus IP address
prefix covering their infrastructure.

> So, I don't think filtering is a useful solution here to the problem
> posed by zero UDP checksums. (An actual UDP checksum solves it, of
> course.)

So if I understand, you like the recommendation that MPLS over UDP be
recommended for service provider use only and you don't like
recommending that the providers filter to protect against IPv6
destination address corruption related to this service.

Curtis

> regards
>  
> Lloyd Wood
> http://about.me/lloydwood
> ________________________________________
> From: Curtis Villamizar [[e-mail]]
> Sent: 22 January 2014 00:24
> To: Wood L  Dr (Electronic Eng)
> Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: [mpls] Last Call: <draft-ietf-mpls-in-udp-04.txt> (Encapsulating MPLS in UDP) to Proposed Standard
>  
> Lloyd,
>  
> Since MPLS over UDP is intended to be used within a provider, how
> about if we recommend the following:
>  
>   If no MPLS over UDP is intended to go outside a service provider,
>   then packet filters should be added to block traffic with the UDP
>   port number for MPLS over UDP to prevent misconfiguation or packet
>   error to cause MPLS over UDP packets to escape,
>  
> If either the IP destination address or the UDP destination port were
> corrupted, then the packet would not leave.  The former because the
> intended destination within the provider would get the packet.  The
> latter because with the UDP port intact the provider's filter would
> block it.
>  
> This would also prevent ordinary users from making use of MPLS over
> UDP, which with its absense of congestion control is causing some
> objections.
>  
> Providers would already be blocking traffic coming into their net with
> this UDP port, particularly to their own infrastructure.  The filters
> might cover only their own addresses allowing users to make use of
> MPLS over UDP, or could block it entirely.
>  
> This is in line with Alia's suggestion that we define a profile of
> intended use being for service providers internal use.
>  
> Curtis
>  
>  
> In message <[e-mail]>
> [e-mail] writes:
> >
> > > When encapsulating in UDP, the UDP checksum might be zero but the IP
> > > checksum can still be filled in so the IP destination is checked
> >
> > IPv6 doesn't have an IP header checksum. So with an error in the
> > header the packet can go anywhere.
> >
> >
> > > Lack of UDP checksum should at worst mean that the destination gets a
> > > packet with a munged payload, pulls off the IP and UDP headers and
> > > continues to forward
> >
> > ... or a munged header, and forwards to a different application on a different port.
> >
> > See RFC 6936 section 3, which goes through the scenarios -  but plays light
> > on the side-effects. My beef is with:
> >
> >    A protocol or application that uses the zero UDP checksum method must
> >    ensure that the lack of checksum does not affect the protocol
> >    operation.  This includes being robust to receiving an unintended
> >    packet from another protocol or context following corruption of a
> >    destination or source address and/or port value.  It also includes
> >    considering the need for additional implicit protection mechanisms
> >    required when using the payload of a UDP packet received with a zero
> >    checksum.
> >
> > Lack of a UDP checksum in one protocol can affect the operation of other
> > protocols minding their own business, until they receive and try to handle
> > a corrupted packet from the first protocol because port or address is
> > corrupted. There are a lot of applications that presume that the data they
> > are given is error-free, and they presume that rogue data is not injected into
> > their conversation.
> >
> > I mean, if you're going to use a zero UDP checksum, and your application
> > messes up and gives itself corrupt data, fine. More fool you. By analogy
> > as a risk, it's like speeding while talking on a cellphone and crashing into a tree.
> > But if your lack of checksum means you affect other applications who have
> > to now protect themselves against your data, you're effectively now crashing
> > into and harming other people. They weren't in armoured cars to protect
> > against this? They had no right to be on the road!
> >
> > Zero UDP checksums are hit-and-run accidents waiting to happen.
> >
> > Lloyd Wood
> > http://about.me/lloydwood
> > ________________________________________
> > From: Curtis Villamizar [[e-mail]]
> > Sent: 21 January 2014 20:14
> > To: Eggert, Lars
> > Cc: Stewart Bryant; Wood L  Dr (Electronic Eng); [e-mail]; Joel Jaeggli; [e-mail]
> > Subject: Re: [mpls] Last Call: <draft-ietf-mpls-in-udp-04.txt> (Encapsulating MPLS in UDP) to Proposed Standard
> >
> > In message <[e-mail]>
> > "Eggert, Lars" writes:
> >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > On 2014-1-21, at 12:50, Stewart Bryant <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > > > In terms of congestion and misdelivery it is interesting looking
> > > > at the number of horses that are already bounding around
> > > > in the paddock outside the stable:
> > > >
> > > > IP types: 47 (GRE) and 137 (MPLS-in-IP) for example.
> > >
> > > there is a big difference between encapsulation in IP and
> > > encapsulation in UDP. Everything encapsulated with "obscure" IP
> > > protocol numbers will get dropped by default at NATs and firewalls,
> > > whereas UDO traffic happily traverses them. The reach of UDP traffic
> > > is much broader.
> > >
> > > Lars
> >
> >
> > Stray UDP packets carrying MPLS getting to grandma's firewall is
> > really stretching the argument but ...
> >
> > When encapsulating in UDP, the UDP checksum might be zero but the IP
> > checksum can still be filled in so the IP destination is checked and
> > grandma need not worry about these packets.  But ...
> >
> > Grandma's firewall would block since there is no state established on
> > the firewall with the opposite port pair pattern.  But ...
> >
> > Even if it went through when the packet reached grandma's subnet the
> > payload is junk bound to an unused port.  Maybe it hits grandma's DNS
> > server and is interpreted as a badly malformed DNS request.
> >
> > So grandma seems safe from these bad packets.
> >
> > Lack of UDP checksum should at worst mean that the destination gets a
> > packet with a munged payload, pulls off the IP and UDP headers and
> > continues to forward.  At worst has the wrong MPLS label and gets
> > blackholed in the provider network somewhere.  If it ends up at the
> > correct MPLS egress, if IP, the IP checksum is checked.  If a TCP or
> > UDP payload carried in that IP got munged the packet could end up at
> > the destination with a bad TCP or UDP checksum and get dropped.
> >
> > Curtis