Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition
Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu> Mon, 02 March 2009 18:45 UTC
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Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2009 13:45:58 -0500
From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu>
To: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
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Cc: der Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG>, saag@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition
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--On Monday, March 02, 2009 12:25:47 PM -0600 Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com> wrote: > On Mon, Mar 02, 2009 at 01:19:13PM -0500, Jeffrey Hutzelman wrote: >> --On Monday, March 02, 2009 11:11:22 AM -0600 Nicolas Williams >> <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com> wrote: >> >> > It will be a long time before users can be trained not to type >> > passwords into attacker-controlled dialogs -- that is definitely true. >> >> No, no. It's a long way down the road to the chemist's. It will be >> _forever_ before users can be trained not to type passwords into >> attacker-controlled dialogs. We've been trying for decades, and some of >> the users in question have _been here_ for decades, and the message >> still hasn't gotten through. > > Mostly because the technology to move beyond application-controlled > dialogs has not been deployed or the technologies that have been have > been unsatisfactory. No, it has nothing to do with the technology. As long as users have a password, they will give it to anyone or anything that asks for it. You'll get through to some of them that they shouldn't give their password away, but not to most of them. Really. It's sad to say, but people in general do _not_ read directions and do _not_ follow procedures, even when they are carefully trained in procedures specifically designed to protect against particular threats, and even when the threat is to the user's life or safety. How do you expect users to remember not to give away their passwords when they can't be bothered to remember to wash their hands or look both ways before crossing a street? -- Jeff
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Peter Gutmann
- [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Chandersekaran, Coimbatore S
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Yoav Nir
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition David McGrew
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition der Mouse
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Paul Hoffman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition David Harrington
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Michael O'Neill
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Theodore Tso
- [saag] Deployment Deadlock Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Bill Sommerfeld
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- [saag] Channel binding is great but not a silver … Sam Hartman
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Alan DeKok
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Alan DeKok
- [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n tra… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Channel binding is great but not a sil… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] Deployment Deadlock Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [saag] Deployment Deadlock Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n… Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n… Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n… Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n… Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Theodore Tso
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition Bill Sommerfeld
- [saag] Credential portability RE: SHA-1 to SHA-n … Hallam-Baker, Phillip