Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition

Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com> Fri, 27 February 2009 04:04 UTC

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Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2009 21:55:54 -0600
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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Cc: der Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG>, saag@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition
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On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 06:23:59PM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I think you're rather overselling here: this only works well for
> account-based systems. There are plenty of cases where I need to
> connect to someone where I only know their name but I don't yet have
> an account (e.g., https://www.amazon.com). The mechanism that you
> provide doesn't work at all in this case. Rather, you need some
> third-party verifiable mechanism. I suppose one could argue that certs
> aren't a good such mechanism, but they're the one that TLS supports
> and I suspect any replacement would smell a lot like certs.

This is quite true.  I did not address enrolment, nor cases where there
is simply no relationship to be had.  A PKI would sure be nice; I just
don't believe we'll have something very close to one.

Regardless of what we do we're likely to just muddle through in the end.