IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n transition)

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Tue, 03 March 2009 00:43 UTC

Return-Path: <kent@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: saag@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: saag@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 970C028C1FE for <saag@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 2 Mar 2009 16:43:40 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.317
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.317 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.282, BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id K-cC-lDuV0Q8 for <saag@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 2 Mar 2009 16:43:39 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx11.bbn.com (mx11.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D47CE3A690D for <saag@ietf.org>; Mon, 2 Mar 2009 16:43:39 -0800 (PST)
Received: from dommiel.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15] helo=[10.71.0.151]) by mx11.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1LeIju-0000lf-DF; Mon, 02 Mar 2009 19:44:06 -0500
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240810c5d22d392aeb@[10.71.0.151]>
In-Reply-To: <20090302205656.GF9992@Sun.COM>
References: <1235663917.3293.16.camel@localhost> <20090226165448.GK9992@Sun.COM> <20090227022359.8D45150822@romeo.rtfm.com> <20090302161134.GG9992@Sun.COM> <20090302172135.DA43650822@romeo.rtfm.com> <200903021720.n22HKZOv006388@grapenut.srv.cs.cmu.edu> <864C82388E530D27DCB6002F@minbar.fac.cs.cmu.edu> <20090302182547.GX9992@Sun.COM> <0DE6E86D395C657BABF43B97@minbar.fac.cs.cmu.edu> <20090302185050.GB9992@Sun.COM> <20090302205656.GF9992@Sun.COM>
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2009 19:44:00 -0500
To: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format="flowed"
Cc: saag@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n transition)
X-BeenThere: saag@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Advisory Group <saag.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag>, <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag>
List-Post: <mailto:saag@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag>, <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2009 00:43:40 -0000

At 2:56 PM -0600 3/2/09, Nicolas Williams wrote:
>Perhaps the simplest fix, technologically speaking, would be to get a
>real PKI -- no technical changes needed, just political ones.  But that
>strikes me as politically infeasible.
>
>A real PKI would imply:
>
>  - trust anchor regulations
>  - CA and DNS registrar regulations that work

As I noted in the message I sent (which crossed in the ether) this is 
not uncommon in Asia.  For example, CAs have to be licensed by the 
government in India (and, I think, South Korea).

But in the EU and U.S.,  we have a laisse fare approach to CA 
regulation. That is a political issue.

Steve

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email