Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition

Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> Mon, 23 February 2009 17:40 UTC

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Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 10:03:17 -0800
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] SHA-1 to SHA-n transition
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At Sun, 22 Feb 2009 20:53:04 -0500,
Stephen Kent wrote:
> 
> At
> >...
> >>  Another vulnerability, and matching MITM attack, is enabled by the
> >>  issuance of certs that contain wildcard DNS names. This is not, a
> >>  violation of P3, because PKIX caved to pressure from the TLS WG, to
> >>  accommodate web site operators who wanted to purchase one cert from a
> >>  TTP that could be used to verify the EE certs for multiple web sites.
> >>  I argued against this, but lost. The phrase "I told you so" comes to
> >>  mind :-).
> >
> >Can you briefly describe how this leads to MITM attacks? This is something
> >I haven't heard before.
> 
> Look at the latter half of these slides for his description of the 
> role that wildcard DNS names on certs play in one class of attacks.
> 
> <https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf>

This gets me a 404 as well.

-Ekr