Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n transition)

Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com> Tue, 03 March 2009 16:38 UTC

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Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2009 10:30:02 -0600
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Or grow a real PKI (Re: SHA-1 to SHA-n transition)
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On Tue, Mar 03, 2009 at 06:25:17AM -0800, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> The only way that an imminent crisis can lead to large scale concerted
> action is if [...]

... it happens.

> You do not need to be an economist or apply fancy algebra to
> understand the effects of economic processes. If we are not prepared
> to try to understand the economists, why should the economists attempt
> to understand us?

As I said, a real PKI is a political problem.  Is it really necessary in
this day and age to point out that economists take a back seat to
politicians?  It seems there's nothing that government can't do now, so
why not a PKI?  :^/

Stephen pointed to regulated PKIs in Asia, proving the point, though if
those PKIs are lousy, then it was a lousy point, but at least we might
be able to gather data on what the impact of a real PKI might be.