[arch-d] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-iab-for-the-users-01.txt

[Guntur Wiseno Putra <[e-mail]>]

Dear Eliot,
architecture-discuss &
others ([e-mail] & Ted),



Would it be about "User-Focused System" (sec. 4.2) or "Positive User
Outcomes" (sec. 4.3)...?



It comes to mind that Internet is about human experiences with such
communication platform enabled by networks of computers: men learn and
learn on what they do: experiences are about things interesting, about
creativities --and thus evolutions, innovations of technologies supporting.
There are networks of interests/intentions of users' & architects' being
impulses of evolutions...

It was examplified by IETF's concerns on evolution ( among others mentioned
in Mark' reference for the draft: RFC 3724 on "evolution"); another is how
the Web's inventor T. Berners-Lee contemplated  its "evolvability" (
https://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/Evolution.html).

Citing a paragraph I sent to [e-mail] with an emphasis on
networks of interests of users' and architects':


"For the Internet and the Web, thus networks of computer-based
communications and informations --at least considering the Web goals of
interoperbility and evolvability/evolution if they are still so while if it
has not been changed evolution is a main concern of Internet engineers--,
there would supposedly be networks of applications supported by languages:
and there would also be those of intentions/interests of users' and
architects'... Is'nt it so..."?


Few other paragraphs of the post could be seen at
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xformsusers/2019Dec/0018.html

Regard,
Guntur Wiseno Putra

Pada Jumat, 13 Desember 2019, Eliot Lear <[e-mail]> menulis:

> Hi Ted, Vittorio, and others,
>
> I am attempting to consolidate this thread with any discussion that might
> take place on architecture-discuss (thus the CC), in large part because
> this isn’t simply related to human rights, as we generally think of them.
> I apologize for the length of this note.
>
> &TLDR; the draft needs to go a little slower on recommendations, and
> should focus more on raising the issues for discussion within our
> community, which are complex, as I will get into below.
>
> Mark and the IAB have taken on a very difficult task, which is to
> establish some sort of priority for end users.  The dialog in the draft has
> shifted over time, and it is often difficult to understand precisely what
> the practical implications of the recommendations are intended to be.  In
> the latest revision, Section 4 is expanded to really delve into the nature
> of harm, and how we should consider harm.  But there are few examples,
> leading to a point where it is difficult to understand the implications of
> what is being said.  I do like the economic incentive discussion, but I’m
> not sure whether it is broadly applicable.  That should get developed a bit
> more.
>
> It concerns me that Paul Wouters can take from this document that somehow
> enterprises do not address end user interests.  The example I always give
> is that of a business who has a regulatory requirement to avoid leaking
> PII.  There are all sorts of toolsets that MITM communications in order to
> *protect* the privacy of account holders.  I think it would be useful for
> the draft to address this example as a bit of a case study.  One can
> reasonably argue that an explicit proxy mechanism on at least one side of a
> communication provides for this, but it begins to encroach on the so-called
> “end-to-end” views (I put that in quotes because the end-to-end model is
> often misused in these sorts of discussions).
>
> I really like the comparison between the web and IoT.  I would go further:
> some of the very same technology that is used to protect users on the web
> may in fact be harmful to users when employed by IoT.  I’ll expand on this
> below.
>
> The most difficult part of the draft remains who gets to decide what is in
> the interest of end users.  IMHO whether it’s governments, NGOs, or
> whoever, there is no way anyone can claim that mantel.  The best we have is
> rough consensus and running code, guided by whatever input participants
> bring to the table.
>
> I would suggest that the IAB go a bit slower with recommendations, and
> focus more on discussion, which is quite valuable.  It’s okay not to have
> all the answers, but it may be just a bit too early to make strong
> recommendation to the IETF because we do not yet see the whole board.  I
> could definitely see this document being revised in an almost bi-annual
> basis, given how fast the state of the art is moving.
>
> Please see below for more:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2019, at 18:03, Ted Lemon <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>
> So e.g. if we were to abandon the end-to-end principle, or advocate
> blocking protocols by default, that would be against the user’s interests.
>   If we were to advocate censorship, that would be against the users’
> interests.   This is clear, because an act of censorship necessarily
> implies that something the user wanted to do, the user can’t do.   That’s
> acting against the user’s interests.
>
>
> As we apply these principles, one person’s censorship is another person’s
> privacy control, as I discussed above and will again below, depending on
> how specific mechanisms are deployed.
>
> Another example of the user’s interest is the user’s interest in privacy.
> You will not find a user out there who doesn’t care about their own
> privacy.
>
>
> Professor Serge Egelman at ICSI has delved deeply into this, and what he
> has found is that people are easily willing to trade off privacy for
> convenience, and we know this to be the case with the Amazon Echo.  But
> they are quite a bit more reticent when they learn that most processing
> goes on in the cloud, or that other people are listening, or when it is
> their children or guests that are being recorded. .  This has ramifications
> for the IETF in as much as our mechanisms are used to enable end-to-end
> communication between Amazon and the home.  OTOH, exactly how much
> information a service keeps once they have it is not something this
> organization can impact.
>
> Complicating matters, privacy cannot be the only concern.  Let’s say that
> a law was passed that required some local processing to address privacy
> concerns.  No matter how you slice it, that harms the environment,
> requiring more power usage, more memory, and more CPU, that eventually
> generates more e-Waste.  If you missed that, it’s an argument in favor of
> end-to-end encryption, but against privacy protections in our protocol
> suite.
>
> Looking at an industrial IOT example, the user may not be typing on the
> interface that controls electrical power or manages a dam, but this may
> have far more impact to individuals than their information being captured
> by hackers.  How does auditing occur when we cannot reasonably trust that
> an end device is secure?  The draft seems to recognize this challenge,
> but I’m not sure that’s reflected in recommendations.  And to just add fuel
> to the dumpster fire, there is plenty of PII mixed in at certain points in
> some industrial environments.
>
> Given the above examples, one could reasonably argue that we should be
> developing 3rd party authorization models for encryption to protect both
> safety and privacy.  But if we do so, would that cause more harm than good
> when dealing with bad actor governments?  I can’t answer that, and anyone
> who can is demonstrating hubris.  The draft can be misinterpreted, I think,
> to say, “if one person benefits and another person is harmed, then do
> nothing”.  Lives are put at risk either way, and while looking at the whole
> board is hard, we have a responsibility to do so to produce least harm,
> assuming we are well suited to even make a call.
>
> You may find users who would like to violate other user’s [sic] privacy,
>
>
> I hope you will be pleased to learn that at least some research (not just
> Egelman’s) shows that people generally don’t like doing this, and in fact
> they won’t sell off other people’s information.  On the other hand, you and
> I have a mutual friend who got royally miffed when I drop shipped to him a
> gift off of the web.  That showed my ignorance at the time that there was
> even a privacy concern to be had.  And so it is not a matter of liking or
> not liking but understanding when that violation is occurring.  Your point
> about transparency is very apt, although the use of “online service
> provider” can be ambiguously interpreted: when we got into this, people in
> this organization viewed telcos as a big threat.  The world has *really* changed
> since then, no?
>
> Eliot
>