Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Mon, 20 August 2018 18:11 UTC

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Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2018 11:11:49 -0700
From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers
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Ted Lemon wrote:
...
> I think HTTPS was pretty hostile to local network policy.   Indeed,
> there was a big argument about that in the TLS working group over the
> past few IETFs.   If you don't want people to use DoH, there's an easy
> solution, which you already need to use regardless: you have to MiTM
> their HTTTPS traffic.   If you don't agree that you have to MiTM their
> HTTPS traffic to achieve what you want, then I think we are not arguing
> about the same thing.

it used to be occasionally necessary. with DOH it will be universally 
nec'y. this will add complexity (so, cost and error rate) and increase 
surveillance. the DOH people should be told not to proceed to draft 
standard until their design accommodates the needs of network operators.

-- 
P Vixie