Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers

Bob Harold <rharolde@umich.edu> Tue, 21 August 2018 17:52 UTC

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From: Bob Harold <rharolde@umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 13:52:41 -0400
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To: drc@virtualized.org
Cc: vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com, IETF DNSOP WG <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers
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On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 1:37 PM David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> wrote:

> Vittorio,
>
> On Aug 21, 2018, at 3:33 AM, Vittorio Bertola <
> vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com> wrote:
>
> If so, I can accept your use case: a smart user, knowing what he is doing,
> does not want anyone else to sanitize his queries for him. But I don't see
> why the best solution to your use case - which is quite a minority case,
> though easily overrepresented in a technical environment - is to build a
> sort of "nuclear bomb" protocol that, if widely adopted, will destroy most
> of the existing practices in the DNS "ecosystem" (I'm using the word that
> was being used at ICANN's DNS Symposium in Montreal), including the basic
> security measures that protect the 99.9% of the users who are not
> technically smart.
>
>
> Perhaps I’m misunderstanding: are you saying the folks who provide
> resolution services in a DoH world would have incentive to not follow basic
> security measures?
>
> Regards,
> -drc
>

At my university, our security group watches DNS rpz logs and DNS traffic
logs for signs of malware, and takes action.  In a DoH world, I cannot
imagine every third-party DoH provider giving our security group that
information.  They will follow their own security measures, but will still
affect ours because we lose visibility.

-- 
Bob Harold