Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers

[Marek Vavruša <[e-mail]>]

On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 5:48 PM, Ted Lemon <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 8:33 PM, Marek Vavruša <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>>
>> > You say that your proposal does not impact DoT's ability to address the
>> > threat model or use case that is the reason it is being used.   But this
>> > is
>> > doesn't make sense to me.   The trust model for DoT and DoH right now is
>> > that they are configured by the user for the user's reasons, or by the
>> > service provider for the service provider's reasons.   You are proposing
>>
>> This is the issue that the draft is trying to solve. The service
>> provider doesn't have a way
>> to configure DoT on the stub resolver. This problem is described in
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8310#section-6.7
>> What I'm trying to address more specifically is
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8310#section-7.3
>
>
>  The document explicitly says that it doesn't have a trust model for DHCP.
>>
>>
>> The "DHCP authentication" does exist, I believe you're referring the
>> deployment status.
>
>
> No, I'm referring to it doesn't exist.   There is no deployable DHCP
> authentication.   The DHC working group tried to come up with one, and
> ultimately concluded that it was not worth it, because the only thing that
> should ever be trusted from a DHCP server is information about the local
> network.   DoH and DoT are out of scope for DHCP according to this
> reasoning.   Bear in mind that we were more optimistic about authentication
> when we did RFC 3315.   RFC 8415, which is in AUTH48, and which supersedes
> RFC3315, is not as optimistic, and only provides for authentication using
> IPsec between server and relay, and authentication for the purpose of doing
> Reconfigure; this authentication is not sufficient to provide assurances of
> trustworthiness.   It's about as secure as a TCP sequence number.
>
>>
>> I'm happy if we say the draft must depend on RFC3315, or discuss the
>> trustworthiness of the responses,
>> but surely there must be a way forward if we want to keep the
>> recursive DNS (last mile) decentralized and free from tampering.
>
>
> There is a way forward: seriously figure out the threat model.   Tom
> Pusateri and another author already did a DHCP document; the reason we
> didn't advance it is that we weren't able to come up with a threat model
> where configuring DoT or DoH made sense.   Until someone does that, there is
> no point in doing further work on a DHCP option.   If we do do further work
> on a DHCP option, Tom's document is more complete than yours.

Can you share the link for the draft for a reference?

Marek