Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Sat, 18 August 2018 23:13 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2018 19:12:57 -0400
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To: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers
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How will you block it?

On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:

>
>
> Ted Lemon wrote:
>
>> DHCP authentication doesn't exist.   We already rejected a draft that
>> described how to set up DoH with DHCP.   Yours is a little more
>> complicated, but doesn't seem any less dangerous.   Before you go any
>> farther on this, you might ask yourself a couple of questions:
>>
>> 1. Why is DoH being used?
>> 2. What is the thread model that DoH is addressing?
>> 3 How does adding this configuration mechanism impact DoH's ability to
>> address that threat model?
>>
>
> the DoH use case is for web users and web apps who do not trust their
> network operator and who are not trusted by their network operator, so it's
> a policies-in-the-night model where data can be imported from The Web
> without approval or permission or control or observability by a network
> operator. it is in other words a thin DNS-only way to do what Tor does.
>
> as a network operator, i oppose this thinking. i predict a long war in
> which web users and apps who want to use DoH to reach an external DNS
> resolver will be treated as attackers, and either banned or blocked. in
> some parts of the world such use will be illegal and even punishable, much
> as Tor is today.
>
> this is what happened after edward snowden flew to hong kong: the pendulum
> swung so far the other way that many of us saw only absurdity.
>
> the possibility that large CDN operators will colo a DOH endpoint with
> their high-value hosting, in order to discourage network operators from
> blocking it, raises the stakes. _i_ will block it. most corporate networks
> will block it in some form. some countries will block it. no DNS content
> will enter my network without having passed through my RPZ rules. if a CDN
> operator wants to play "chicken", i guess that we will.
>
> --
> P Vixie
>
>