Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Wed, 22 August 2018 16:42 UTC

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Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2018 09:42:01 -0700
From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
CC: Bob Harold <rharolde@umich.edu>, IETF DNSOP WG <dnsop@ietf.org>, Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>, David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Draft for dynamic discovery of secure resolvers
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this will be my last post on this topic; happy to continue on DHCP matters.

Ted Lemon wrote:
> ... In fact, though, the people who are currently providing DoH service
> actually have much greater visibility into the malware problem than you
> possibly can. ...

this is a false equivalence.

i have responsibility for my network's security. the DoH provider does not.

i _will_ know what's targetting me. the DoH provider _might_ know.

i know my policies and tradeoffs. the DoH provider will not know.

if i choose to outsource my perimeter defense, that's one thing. but to 
have a visitor or BYOD or malware or employee or family member decide to 
do this, is quite another.

the DoH team has badly misunderstood a full segment of the community, 
and the resulting knee-jerk ignorant politics-based engineering is going 
to have a very long tail of foreseeable negative side effects.

-- P Vixie