Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement

Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> Wed, 07 September 2011 00:49 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 16:50:56 -0800
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement
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On 09/06/2011 04:23 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> I just looked at the most recent specifications for TLS (RFC 5246) and
> secure shell (RFC 4253), which I think we'd all agree are two quite
> successful security technologies. Neither of those specs says anything
> about not protecting humans users from malicious clients that perform
> keylogging to capture security-critical data the user might enter.

I think there's an argument to be made that the user interface
is sufficiently different that those might not be a great model.
But it's also the case that there have been security problems
with both that may or may not have been avoided in part by
putting in warnings not to trust every crappy, random CA
certificate that wafts by, or not to respond "Sure - thanks!"
to every ssh host key you're offered.

Melinda