Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement

Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im> Wed, 07 September 2011 18:40 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 Sep 2011 12:42:11 -0600
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement
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On 9/7/11 12:34 PM, Melinda Shore wrote:
> On 09/07/2011 10:22 AM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>> You should read the threat model document. This document has more
>> editorial on these kinds of issues.
> 
> This seems reasonable to me, and thank you so much for departing
> from what seems to be standard working group mode by dealing with
> this like an adult.

Is it really juvenile to point out that specs for widely-deployed
security technologies also don't cover threats like keyloggers?

> It seems to me that there are some usability problems that while
> not being unique to oauth, really aren't that much like what
> we usually run into with on-the-wire protocols.  Documents in
> the security area have typically not dealt with usability issues
> even when, perhaps, they should, given their impact on how
> secure a technology is in the field.  Getting that into a threat
> model document sounds about right to me.

Agreed. In fact, I hope that we'll all be able to turn more attention to
the threat-model document soon, because it's quite comprehensive and
useful. The usability issues are indeed a bit different here, although
usability is not exactly easy in the case of, say, TLS with PKI certs
issued by certification authorities (as witness recent events -- have
you scrubbed your root cert store lately?).

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/