Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement

[Eran Hammer-Lahav <[e-mail]>]

Don't install crap on you device or computer. OAuth is the least of your concern if you install bad software. 

If there was a solution to this we would not need an antivirus. 

EHL 

On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:23, "Michael Thomas" <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:
>> I agree. If you are going to install a native app, you better trust it not to do bad things. Grabbing your password is the least interesting thing such an app can abuse. I don't see any need to change the v2 draft. 
> 
> How, exactly, is the user supposed to protect themselves against rogue apps?
> It sounds like the solution is to tell them to never use oauth in an app at all.
> 
> Is oauth only intended to be used on standalone trustable web browsers? I don't recall
> seeing that anywhere.
> 
> Mike
> 
>> 
>> EHL
>> 
>> On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:10, "Igor Faynberg" <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>>> Mike,
>>> 
>>> You've got the problem statement right: allowing the user to authorize  
>>> resource access to another party without divulging user's credentials is 
>>> the objective of OAuth. You are also right in that the attack you have 
>>> described defies the whole purpose of OAuth.  I do not think though that 
>>> it is related to OAuth per se.
>>> 
>>> To this end, the security work led by Torsten has thoroughly analyzed 
>>> the protocol and specified protection against multiple protocol 
>>> attacks.  From what you described, it appears to me that the attack you 
>>> mention is not related to the protocol but rather to the user's 
>>> environment.  There is no possible protection from key loggers that a 
>>> protocol can implement. I could be mistaken; in any case, it looks like 
>>> the problem rests with the implementation of WebView.
>>> 
>>> If I am wrong, I would appreciate a detailed description of what happened.
>>> 
>>> Igor
>>> 
>>> On 9/6/2011 1:40 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:
>>>> Hi all,
>>>> 
>>>> Barry suggested that I might subscribe and explain what I sent him.
>>>> 
>>>> My basic problem is that in neither the protocol nor the threats drafts,
>>>> I can't seem to find what problem is actually trying to be solved with
>>>> oauth, and what assumptions you're making about various elements.
>>>> 
>>>> Here's what I did. I've written an app, and I wanted re-integrate the
>>>> ability to send tweets after they deprecated Basic. So the app has a
>>>> webView (android, iphone...) which it obviously completely controls.
>>>> With oauth, the webview UA will ultimately redirect off to Twitter's
>>>> site to collect the user's credentials and grant my app's backend an
>>>> access token (sorry if I get terminology screwed up, i'm just coming
>>>> up to speed).
>>>> 
>>>> What occurs to me is that webview affords exactly zero protection from
>>>> my client (ie, the app) from getting the user's twitter credentials. All
>>>> I have to do is set up a keypress handler on that webview and in a few
>>>> minutes of hacking I have a key logger. etc.
>>>> 
>>>> So what I can't tell is whether this is a "problem" or not, because I
>>>> don't know what problem you're trying to solve. If the object of oauth
>>>> isn't to keep user/server credentials out of the hands of a third party,
>>>> then what is it trying to solve? Is there an expectation that the
>>>> UA is trusted by the user/server? What happens when that's not the case?
>>>> 
>>>> Regardless of whether I'm misunderstanding, it would sure be nice to have
>>>> both the problem and your assumptions laid out, hopefully with some 
>>>> prominence
>>>> so you don't get these sort of dumb questions.
>>>> 
>>>> Mike
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