Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement

[Michael Thomas <[e-mail]>]

William Mills wrote:
>  > How, exactly, is the user supposed to protect themselves against 
> rogue apps?
> 
> Don't install them.

Will they be marked with rfc 3514?

Mike

> 
> *From:* Michael Thomas <[e-mail]>
> *To:* Eran Hammer-Lahav <[e-mail]>
> *Cc:* "[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 6, 2011 11:23 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement
> 
> Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:
>  > I agree. If you are going to install a native app, you better trust 
> it not to do bad things. Grabbing your password is the least interesting 
> thing such an app can abuse. I don't see any need to change the v2 draft.
> 
> How, exactly, is the user supposed to protect themselves against rogue apps?
> It sounds like the solution is to tell them to never use oauth in an app 
> at all.
> 
> Is oauth only intended to be used on standalone trustable web browsers? 
> I don't recall
> seeing that anywhere.
> 
> Mike
> 
>  >
>  > EHL
>  >
>  > On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:10, "Igor Faynberg" 
> <[e-mail] 
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>  >
>  >> Mike,
>  >>
>  >> You've got the problem statement right: allowing the user to 
> authorize  resource access to another party without divulging user's 
> credentials is the objective of OAuth. You are also right in that the 
> attack you have described defies the whole purpose of OAuth.  I do not 
> think though that it is related to OAuth per se.
>  >>
>  >> To this end, the security work led by Torsten has thoroughly 
> analyzed the protocol and specified protection against multiple protocol 
> attacks.  From what you described, it appears to me that the attack you 
> mention is not related to the protocol but rather to the user's 
> environment.  There is no possible protection from key loggers that a 
> protocol can implement. I could be mistaken; in any case, it looks like 
> the problem rests with the implementation of WebView.
>  >>
>  >> If I am wrong, I would appreciate a detailed description of what 
> happened.
>  >>
>  >> Igor
>  >>
>  >> On 9/6/2011 1:40 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:
>  >>> Hi all,
>  >>>
>  >>> Barry suggested that I might subscribe and explain what I sent him.
>  >>>
>  >>> My basic problem is that in neither the protocol nor the threats 
> drafts,
>  >>> I can't seem to find what problem is actually trying to be solved with
>  >>> oauth, and what assumptions you're making about various elements.
>  >>>
>  >>> Here's what I did. I've written an app, and I wanted re-integrate the
>  >>> ability to send tweets after they deprecated Basic. So the app has a
>  >>> webView (android, iphone...) which it obviously completely controls.
>  >>> With oauth, the webview UA will ultimately redirect off to Twitter's
>  >>> site to collect the user's credentials and grant my app's backend an
>  >>> access token (sorry if I get terminology screwed up, i'm just coming
>  >>> up to speed).
>  >>>
>  >>> What occurs to me is that webview affords exactly zero protection from
>  >>> my client (ie, the app) from getting the user's twitter 
> credentials. All
>  >>> I have to do is set up a keypress handler on that webview and in a few
>  >>> minutes of hacking I have a key logger. etc.
>  >>>
>  >>> So what I can't tell is whether this is a "problem" or not, because I
>  >>> don't know what problem you're trying to solve. If the object of oauth
>  >>> isn't to keep user/server credentials out of the hands of a third 
> party,
>  >>> then what is it trying to solve? Is there an expectation that the
>  >>> UA is trusted by the user/server? What happens when that's not the 
> case?
>  >>>
>  >>> Regardless of whether I'm misunderstanding, it would sure be nice 
> to have
>  >>> both the problem and your assumptions laid out, hopefully with some 
> prominence
>  >>> so you don't get these sort of dumb questions.
>  >>>
>  >>> Mike
>  >>> _______________________________________________
>  >>> OAuth mailing list
>  >>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>  >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>  >> _______________________________________________
>  >> OAuth mailing list
>  >> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>  >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>  > _______________________________________________
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>  > [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>  > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> 
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