Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement

Paul Madsen <paul.madsen@gmail.com> Tue, 06 September 2011 18:10 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 14:12:43 -0400
From: Paul Madsen <paul.madsen@gmail.com>
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement
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that is the original problem statement, but surely no longer the only one

On 9/6/11 2:10 PM, Igor Faynberg wrote:
> Mike,
>
> You've got the problem statement right: allowing the user to 
> authorize  resource access to another party without divulging user's 
> credentials is the objective of OAuth. You are also right in that the 
> attack you have described defies the whole purpose of OAuth.  I do not 
> think though that it is related to OAuth per se.
>
> To this end, the security work led by Torsten has thoroughly analyzed 
> the protocol and specified protection against multiple protocol 
> attacks.  From what you described, it appears to me that the attack 
> you mention is not related to the protocol but rather to the user's 
> environment.  There is no possible protection from key loggers that a 
> protocol can implement. I could be mistaken; in any case, it looks 
> like the problem rests with the implementation of WebView.
>
> If I am wrong, I would appreciate a detailed description of what 
> happened.
>
> Igor
>
> On 9/6/2011 1:40 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> Barry suggested that I might subscribe and explain what I sent him.
>>
>> My basic problem is that in neither the protocol nor the threats drafts,
>> I can't seem to find what problem is actually trying to be solved with
>> oauth, and what assumptions you're making about various elements.
>>
>> Here's what I did. I've written an app, and I wanted re-integrate the
>> ability to send tweets after they deprecated Basic. So the app has a
>> webView (android, iphone...) which it obviously completely controls.
>> With oauth, the webview UA will ultimately redirect off to Twitter's
>> site to collect the user's credentials and grant my app's backend an
>> access token (sorry if I get terminology screwed up, i'm just coming
>> up to speed).
>>
>> What occurs to me is that webview affords exactly zero protection from
>> my client (ie, the app) from getting the user's twitter credentials. All
>> I have to do is set up a keypress handler on that webview and in a few
>> minutes of hacking I have a key logger. etc.
>>
>> So what I can't tell is whether this is a "problem" or not, because I
>> don't know what problem you're trying to solve. If the object of oauth
>> isn't to keep user/server credentials out of the hands of a third party,
>> then what is it trying to solve? Is there an expectation that the
>> UA is trusted by the user/server? What happens when that's not the case?
>>
>> Regardless of whether I'm misunderstanding, it would sure be nice to 
>> have
>> both the problem and your assumptions laid out, hopefully with some 
>> prominence
>> so you don't get these sort of dumb questions.
>>
>> Mike
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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