Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement

Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> Tue, 06 September 2011 22:20 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 14:22:52 -0800
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement
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On 09/06/2011 12:59 PM, John Kemp wrote:
> The point is that you have a point.

He does, and that's in some large part why I don't
fully understand the temperature of the responses.
I do not think it's a particularly big deal to stick
a couple of sentences in the security considerations
underscoring the fact that OAUTH can't do anything
about a compromised host or a malicious application.
I've learned to live with the fact that sometimes
people implementing or deploying security technologies
don't fully understand them and it's my impression that
there's some number of people out there who think that
OAUTH and other third-party protocols provide sufficient
protection against password snagging.

Melinda