Re: [rtcweb] Consensus call regarding media security

Iñaki Baz Castillo <> Thu, 29 March 2012 17:33 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E27A21F884F for <>; Thu, 29 Mar 2012 10:33:14 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.626
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.626 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.051, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WROs1nuqnKU1 for <>; Thu, 29 Mar 2012 10:33:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9511621F8820 for <>; Thu, 29 Mar 2012 10:33:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by vcbfk13 with SMTP id fk13so1951667vcb.31 for <>; Thu, 29 Mar 2012 10:33:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-gm-message-state; bh=1EQ/xZM0VtmlgnGeK3it3OJ+u4XBQnBc7MsX/8ZbUe0=; b=nuL7ssQdF/CedQlKBKsFCbFh4ytV8elXFvD8JxUMpIgMOf1Pi0e23F54iKjoyg0br0 0xcVwTHjGkZqJMeNR3W9mcc59Te6CqToHD4ZqitazYUBb3XzWRhlEGJDPZgVyuoao7Hh JFgHIu6PmmaYIf3bq0pw8omTQqusPEMwNYBuyP52XyaPOUOlXriPygLwYCUcreTMLKDC 1HAOOaQXoxxkAx5t6B0lCP/n+idXNsQicOCNmbWMhy8EaimnyrkQ83M0FlHdNrNe17ck viqjUUvr7trHSlBvmy3gYTbjQMDJbS+KzJZ5R3CqceOcaoA2oQqiwDmZTN6O0hJF6wgY f0kA==
Received: by with SMTP id a9mr3022004vdd.34.1333042393159; Thu, 29 Mar 2012 10:33:13 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by with HTTP; Thu, 29 Mar 2012 10:32:51 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <>
References: <> <>
From: =?UTF-8?Q?I=C3=B1aki_Baz_Castillo?= <>
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 19:32:51 +0200
Message-ID: <>
To: "Ravindran, Parthasarathi" <>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmjKhT1jQhgQZCahXLHdtiUmHqfNNys5a8egyjzxLTFA0hh0AAzFu6lqLerd1GhXKCnHsON
Cc: "" <>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Consensus call regarding media security
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Real-Time Communication in WEB-browsers working group list <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 17:33:14 -0000

2012/3/29 Ravindran, Parthasarathi <>:
> WebRTC trust model has to be considered as one of the main factor for deciding the key mechanism. AFAIK, SDES does not fit into WebRTC as Dr.Evil HTTPS RTCWeb server must be trusted in case of SDES. There is no means to track or analyze whether Dr.Evil involves in monitoring or recording or terminate the media traffic.  It will be good in case whoever advocate for SDES explain how SDES fits within WebRTC trust model.

If Dr. Evil attaks my back webpage and owns it, and then I visit it
(HTTPS with valid certificate) and enter my back credentials... for me
that is much worse than the case you describe. Should we drop HTTPS
then because it does not fit 100% "security" requirements?

BTW: previously you wanted to allow plain RTP in WebRTC... and now
DTLS-SRTP is the only valid solution? :)

Iñaki Baz Castillo