Re: [stir] current draft charter - ENUM and databases

[Henning Schulzrinne <[e-mail]>]

Having been involved in LoST, this isn't quite the same as the PAI "transitive trust". In this particular case, NRA or number assignment authorities would announce their coverage regions, and maybe additional information, such as entry points into DNS or data stores. Each entity would only have to trust announcements, presumably signed, that it likes, rather than receiver of information D trusting that A, B and C on the call path are trustworthy and didn't mangle or fake the information, as in PAI.

I don't think there's much of an issue with number allocators trusting each other, compared to trusting a random carrier the recipient has never heard of.

Thus, I'd avoid the use of the term "transitive" trust here.

Henning

On Jun 18, 2013, at 2:54 PM, Hadriel Kaplan <[e-mail]> wrote:

> 
> We already have a transitive-trust of model for caller-id: P-Asserted-Identity.
> It's the lack of faith in transitive-trust that brought us here, isn't it?
> 
> -hadriel
> 
> 
> On Jun 18, 2013, at 1:55 PM, Brian Rosen <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
>>> I read LoST a long time ago, and skimmed it again today, but I don't get any inspiration relative to STIR.  What dots am I supposed to be connecting?
>>> No need for a long explanation, just some hints would be good. :)
>> LoST avoids a golden root by establishing a kind of transitive trust model where an entity called a "Forest Guide" knows about other Forest Guides and their coverage region by some unspecified means and can refer a request for service in one of the known coverage regions to the proper Forest Guide.  Rather than having a root and a delegation model, it relies on Forest Guide operators working out who should be trusted among themselves.
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> 
>