Re: [stir] Not just "called party" - Re: current draft charter

[Hadriel Kaplan <[e-mail]>]

For sake of focus and having a prayer of getting this done before we all retire, I think we should focus exclusively on caller-id reputability.  No bank would ever trust this type of thing for called-party identity anyway, because it only identifies phone numbers not humans - i.e., at best it identifies a phone, not the person on the other end.  Thus they'll have to ask you a bunch of identifying questions anyway.

-hadriel


On Jun 17, 2013, at 1:38 PM, Dan York <[e-mail]> wrote:

> I would not necessarily restrict it to the "called party".  This is the
> dominant use case we've been discussing, I.e that I receive a call and
> want to be as certain as possible about the identity of the endpoint
> calling me.
> 
> However, I could be calling out to my customers or clients and as the
> "calling party" would like to be as certain as possible that I am reaching
> the correct endpoint.  Consider a bank wanting to reach a customer about
> issues with the customer's account - or to verify a recent transaction. Or
> a doctor's office want to relay results to a patient and wanting to be
> sure they are reaching the patient's number.
> 
> My understanding is that we are aiming to solve the "secure origin
> identification" challenge - and that could apply to either or both ends of
> the conversation.
> 
> Dan
> 
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