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Re: [stir] current draft charter

Michael Hammer <michael.hammer@yaanatech.com> Mon, 17 June 2013 18:05 UTC

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From: Michael Hammer <michael.hammer@yaanatech.com>
To: "hadriel.kaplan@oracle.com" <hadriel.kaplan@oracle.com>
Thread-Topic: [stir] current draft charter
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Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2013 18:05:00 +0000
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Cc: "stir@ietf.org" <stir@ietf.org>, "richard@shockey.us" <richard@shockey.us>
Subject: Re: [stir] current draft charter
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That is a key distinction and ties into my assertion that the CC numbering
authority must control that.

But, clarify one thing for me.  Does DNSSEC ensure both:
-  that the uploading of information is authentic,
-  attempts to read the data actually get to that secure entry?

Mike


-----Original Message-----
From: Hadriel Kaplan [mailto:hadriel.kaplan@oracle.com] 
Sent: Monday, June 17, 2013 1:44 PM
To: Michael Hammer
Cc: richard@shockey.us; stir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [stir] current draft charter


On Jun 17, 2013, at 1:31 PM, Michael Hammer <michael.hammer@yaanatech.com>
wrote:

> My point was that the mere fact of being in DNS did not convey any 
> trustability.
> So, not objecting to DNS being used to find authoritative servers, 
> just that it itself is not authoritative.

Just to be clear I've been using the term "DNS", but actually meaning it
with DNSSEC.  If the country-code level domains are under the authority of
the national numbering plan admins for each country, then with DNSSEC they'd
be the ones signing the resource record entries in their DNS tree.  I can't
imagine who could be more authoritative for a country's E.164 numbers than
the national number plan admin.  They're certainly more authoritative than
existing certificate CAs, for example.
:)

-hadriel

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