[stir] Not just "called party" - Re: current draft charter

Dan York <york@isoc.org> Mon, 17 June 2013 17:38 UTC

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From: Dan York <york@isoc.org>
To: Michael Hammer <michael.hammer@yaanatech.com>, "hgs@cs.columbia.edu" <hgs@cs.columbia.edu>, "hadriel.kaplan@oracle.com" <hadriel.kaplan@oracle.com>
Thread-Topic: Not just "called party" - Re: [stir] current draft charter
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Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2013 17:38:16 +0000
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Subject: [stir] Not just "called party" - Re: current draft charter
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On 6/17/13 12:04 PM, "Michael Hammer" <michael.hammer@yaanatech.com> wrote:

>Third point:  The called party needs to unequivocally know how to validate
>an assertion and who to go to for the inputs to perform that validation.

I would not necessarily restrict it to the "called party".  This is the
dominant use case we've been discussing, I.e that I receive a call and
want to be as certain as possible about the identity of the endpoint
calling me.

However, I could be calling out to my customers or clients and as the
"calling party" would like to be as certain as possible that I am reaching
the correct endpoint.  Consider a bank wanting to reach a customer about
issues with the customer's account - or to verify a recent transaction. Or
a doctor's office want to relay results to a patient and wanting to be
sure they are reaching the patient's number.

My understanding is that we are aiming to solve the "secure origin
identification" challenge - and that could apply to either or both ends of
the conversation.

Dan