RE: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?

"Anantha Ramaiah \(ananth\)" <ananth@cisco.com> Fri, 28 September 2007 19:08 UTC

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Subject: RE: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2007 12:08:08 -0700
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Thread-Topic: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?
Thread-Index: AcgB/AEKuqonYB/3RRS96jK/enM7iAABND4A
From: "Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <ananth@cisco.com>
To: mallman@icir.org
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: mallman@icir.org [mailto:mallman@icir.org] 
> Sent: Friday, September 28, 2007 11:17 AM
> To: Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)
> Cc: David Borman; Pekka Savola; tcpm@ietf.org; Fernando Gont
> Subject: Re: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend? 
> 
> 
> Anantha-
> 
> I have to say I am pretty drained from reading this thread 
> and really don't know if we have consensus on anything or are 
> driving towards developing it.

FWIW, the "majority vote" still stands at "2 SHOULDs and 1 MAY" ? So
there is some consensus, it appears.

> 
> The one thing that really confuses me in this discussion is 
> the statements like this:
> 
> > Since, all these discussions about started due to TCP 
> secure, let me 
> > use the same as an example. There is nothing wrong in making all 
> > mitigations SHOULD since the "very good reason" can be one of :-
> 
> It really seems to me that you are equating MAY and SHOULD.  

Sorry, I didn't mean to.

> It seems like this is saying that implementers can come up 
> with any reason to not implement tcpsecure if we tag these 
> with a SHOULD.  I think I understand a number of other 

Yes, my thinking was always been : since it isn't a MUST, SHOULD gives
that leeway. SHOULD gives the leeway that "you can chose not to
implement if you have some good reasons". I had pointed out the list of
reasons already. So are those reasons not "good enough" ?

> people's distinctions between MAY and SHOULD, but I cannot 
> figure out how you differentiate them and therefore I cannot 
> figure out why you think they ought to be SHOULD and not MAY.

My argument is simple, SHOULD gives a leeway and I think MAY is very
weak. As somone pointed out MAY is equated to "MAY NOT" esp, when the
recommendation is from a security viewpoint.

-Anantha
> 
> allman
> 
> 
> 
> 


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