RE: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?

"Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <ananth@cisco.com> Sun, 30 September 2007 06:45 UTC

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Subject: RE: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?
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Thread-Topic: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?
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From: "Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <ananth@cisco.com>
To: "Joe Touch" <touch@ISI.EDU>
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> > I will have to dis-agree to this since my viewpoint is 
> different. TCP 
> > secure adds robustness to the processing of certain TCP segments, 
> > which in turn helps to counter *some* spoofing attacks. 
> Calling it as 
> > an authentication scheme seems too far-fetched.
> 
> You are making an assertion about whether you believe the 
> packet is spoofed or not based on its content matching what 
> you expect from the true endpoint.
> 
> That is called authentication. Weak, but still authentication.

I am uncomfortable calling TCP secure as an authentication scheme. I
would love to hear what others have to say on this.

> 
> > WHEREAS
> > 
> > TCP MD5, IPsec etc., are meant to be wholesome 
> authentication schemes.
> > Also this requires additional complexity in both software 
> and hardware.
> 
> In EITHER hardware or software. Neither one requires 
> hardware. The level of additional complexity is commensurate 
> with the level of protection they afford.

Agreed. Actually, I wanted to say "it may require hardware assist" 

-Anantha


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