RE: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?

["Anantha Ramaiah \(ananth\)" <[e-mail]>]

> 
> Anantha Ramaiah (ananth) wrote:
> ...
> > If we have to fix multiple layers, lets fix it, I have no problems. 
> > You can do all at once or piecemeal, as simple as that. It doesn't 
> > matter whether spoofing is standalone or not, it is about 
> how well you 
> > can make your TCP stack respond to such malicious attacks, 
> if you care to do so.
> 
> TCP is not a secure protocol. It's not intended for 
> protection from malicious attacks per se; 'fixing' it is to 
> assert your solution on everyone, as below.

I see what you are saying except the "asserting your solution part". 

But you seem to equating some efforts of making TCP more robust to TCP
have an Ipsec like functionality, very far fetched, IMO.

Hmm... It boils to your favorite line of thinking : "Don't make any
robustness changes in TCP, just use IPsec", I thought we have beaten
that to death long time ago. :-)

Anyways, I don't want to side-track this discussion from it's original
intent viz., "strength of mitigations"

-Anantha

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