Re: [Idr] IETF LC for IDR-ish document <draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-05.txt> (Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies) to Proposed Standard

[Jared Mauch <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 03:56:25PM +0200, Robert Raszuk wrote:
> >
> > > And if you are customer and have 4 prefixes in BGP table thing are fine.
> > If
> > > you by accident become transit and advertise fulm table around I think we
> > > can do better in BGP to protect from it then mandate policy.
> >
> > Evidence shows that, as of today, we can not.
> >
> 
> ​Have anyone actually tried ?​

	Yes.

	Please see the past decade of history.

> The BGP origin validation was at least one attempt.
> 
> The other one could be as simple as *"ebgp policy auto"* where based in the
> IRRDB and your peer's AS router can build a policy automagically using say
> BGPQ3.
> 
> http://snar.spb.ru/prog/bgpq3/
> 
> Otherwise while Jared, you and perhaps most folks on this list already have
> automated ways to build nice and accurate policies I suspect they are those
> which do not. And those would either put "allow all" or will now start
> looking for hints "what do I put in".

> And if the end result is what you are doing twice a day why router's can't
> do it themselves assuming IRRDB or any other src of truth is accurate ?

	You use the best available data you have as a network operator.

	- Jared

-- 
Jared Mauch  | pgp key available via finger from [e-mail]
clue++;      | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/  My statements are only mine.