RE: Address privacy

"Manfredi (US), Albert E" <albert.e.manfredi@boeing.com> Mon, 27 January 2020 02:27 UTC

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From: "Manfredi (US), Albert E" <albert.e.manfredi@boeing.com>
To: Gyan Mishra <hayabusagsm@gmail.com>
CC: 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Address privacy
Thread-Topic: Address privacy
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Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 02:27:07 +0000
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From: Gyan Mishra <hayabusagsm@gmail.com> 

On Sun, Jan 26, 2020 at 5:00 PM Brian E Carpenter <mailto:brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> wrote:

>> The IID is normally set *before* the host generates its Link Local address, which is normally before it starts to listen for RAs from which it will learn the current prefix(es).
>>
>> So you'd have to make the IID for SLAAC independent of the IID for LL (which is of course exactly what RFC4941 does).
>
> Gyan>  Agreed.  So the happy medium achieved for two camps on opposite ends of the spectrum.

Right. My reaction to Brian's response was, "Exactly!" This holds for any new address the OS wants to configure, obviously including, if it wants for any reason, two addresses with the same prefix.

> 1.  End user privacy on mobile device connected at home or 
>
> 2.  End user privacy within an enterprise- non-existent as IT security and availability for mission critical applications -IPv6 stability and tracking ability is the primary objective.

Or, we should add, the end user privacy when he takes his phone or laptop to Starbucks, and uses it while eating a croissant.

Two more points:

Even finding a way to hide the IP source address does not solve this privacy issue. A hacker can monitor destination addresses too, in that Starbucks joint, to see where someone might be, if IIDs were completely permanent.

And the other, less important point, has anyone else noticed that TV shows have finally gotten a bit of a clue about IP addresses? At least some. Used to be that the presumption was, the source IP address, even on the move, identified an individual, so you could obtain his name. I've noticed lately, the IP address identifies where the bad guy is, at the moment. Progress.

(The addresses are still IPv4, sort of, such as 354.939.535.434. Still haven't found the RFC that describes these. Maybe, IPv7.)

Bert