Re: Address privacy

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Tue, 28 January 2020 16:52 UTC

Return-Path: <nick@foobar.org>
X-Original-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 76C1812004A for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 28 Jan 2020 08:52:03 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LGb3eXyJkYea for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 28 Jan 2020 08:52:01 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.netability.ie (mail.netability.ie [IPv6:2a03:8900:0:100::5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7CE4812004F for <ipv6@ietf.org>; Tue, 28 Jan 2020 08:52:00 -0800 (PST)
X-Envelope-To: ipv6@ietf.org
Received: from cupcake.local (089-101-195156.ntlworld.ie [89.101.195.156] (may be forged)) (authenticated bits=0) by mail.netability.ie (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTPSA id 00SGprM4057009 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 28 Jan 2020 16:51:55 GMT (envelope-from nick@foobar.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: cheesecake.ibn.ie: Host 089-101-195156.ntlworld.ie [89.101.195.156] (may be forged) claimed to be cupcake.local
Subject: Re: Address privacy
To: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>, 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>
References: <03C832CE-7282-4320-BF1B-4CB7167FE6BE@employees.org> <MN2PR11MB3565330989D411525D30B90DD80F0@MN2PR11MB3565.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> <80207E17-AE8E-4D19-B516-D2E6AB70721E@employees.org> <8D5610EA-49D3-483E-BB7A-67D67BC89346@jisc.ac.uk> <DE7B0688-230F-4A5C-8E24-9EAED9FD9FEB@puck.nether.net> <CAO42Z2zXwVnzemRqyqy78czpHjZm0nhkCJgVrx=-fmt+C6MnSA@mail.gmail.com> <1962.1579823388@localhost> <f83ab037-9125-bb74-dbac-68850aeb1020@huitema.net> <CBB23ABE-A7A3-4208-873C-E47EE063E34B@fugue.com> <11855.1579980079@localhost> <CALx6S36V_VjaxhELYcsgDYLWsCkj20p6gtiY9T9Q=9-9Oibyjw@mail.gmail.com> <32626.1580060558@localhost> <CALx6S37prWACD0jv9c-XHD-JtPqZAcgeT2Ax0EZHkiQaDR4t=g@mail.gmail.com> <419b7c7a-e364-7951-5a44-6c39e1da65fb@joelhalpern.com> <CALx6S36802oDaEgojAPq2c6hM_s1BayidXPh1Sc6RZmZa9UHpQ@mail.gmail.com> <6c5ba72d-9289-90ba-a1c9-2307ed29a4da@foobar.org> <a98bf2ab-32e7-459b-14d2-5e0e1c65a229@si6networks.com> <CALx6S36J5TPnXJQyMW2NUbQV6KL_oqUQ01m+BEzBJ+xcHpmQWw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
Message-ID: <d763dc26-57bb-c67d-f727-617a6b52d813@foobar.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 16:51:03 +0000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 PostboxApp/7.0.11
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <CALx6S36J5TPnXJQyMW2NUbQV6KL_oqUQ01m+BEzBJ+xcHpmQWw@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Language: en-GB
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipv6/pQ7Yxsu8HUZZMcGcS0oZAFxYZ8U>
X-BeenThere: ipv6@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "IPv6 Maintenance Working Group \(6man\)" <ipv6.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ipv6/>
List-Post: <mailto:ipv6@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 16:52:03 -0000

Tom Herbert wrote on 28/01/2020 03:10:
> Yes, that's the "always on" network application that would allow
> address tracking and identification at even high frequency of address
> change. An exploit based on that is described in section 4.4 of
> draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00. I believe the only way
> to defeat this exploit would be single use (per flow), uncorrelated
> address.

persistent identification for apps (browser / mobile / etc) is handled 
using a variety of mechanisms, primarily client fingerprinting.  The 
best known example of client fingerprinting would be application 
cookies.  IP addressing information is only one input source and 
probably one of the less important ones because of the poor correlation 
between ip addresses and end users (e.g. large 1:n nats), and ip address 
changes (office to train wifi, to in-car cellular to home broadband, to 
coffee shop, etc).

Overall privacy addresses fall into the category of things that seemed 
like a good idea at the time but in retrospect their usefulness fell 
away as people worked out other, more accurate ways to track end users 
and end user devices.

Nick