Re: Address privacy (was: Re: RFC4941bis: consequences of many addresses for the network)

Gyan Mishra <hayabusagsm@gmail.com> Sun, 26 January 2020 03:07 UTC

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From: Gyan Mishra <hayabusagsm@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2020 22:07:24 -0500
Message-ID: <CABNhwV0C7pgYXstVqkOXUebrMifZux=UT8QadqPCHs7EHopLwg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Address privacy (was: Re: RFC4941bis: consequences of many addresses for the network)
To: Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net>
Cc: 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
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O’Reilly is a famous author that has written many books on networking
technology and had written this draft on criminal attribution
characteristics of IPv6 address assignment.

He is talking about how RFC 4941 privacy extension temporary address user
privacy requirements directly impacts law enforcement   in tracking down
criminal activity using the web and/or any cyber crimes.

After reading this you really have to think hard as to why as to why users
connected to the internet require privacy of their IPv6 address so it
cannot be tracked,

All electronic commerce is secure and so why does you IPv6 address have to
be private so it’s untraceable.

Other then criminal intent and not leaving an IPv6 trail that can be traced
to the criminal activity of the perpetrators by law enforcement I cannot
think of a reason for IPv6 address privacy.

Please enlightened me.

Analysis of the Crime Attribution Characteristics of Various IPv6 Address
Assignment Techniques
draft-daveor-ipv6-crime-attribution-00
Abstract
<https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-daveor-ipv6-crime-attribution-00.html#rfc.abstract>

The migration from IPv4 to IPv6 is intended to fix a large number of
problems with IPv4 that have been identified through many years of global
use, not least of which is the shortage of available IPv4 addresses. One of
the challenges with IPv4 that has not, apparently, been adequately
considered is the crime attribution characteristics of IPv6 technologies.

The challenge of crime attribution on the Internet is an important one and
a careful balance needs to be struck between the needs of law enforcement,
the rights of crime victims and the right to privacy of the vast majority
of Internet users who have no involvement in any sort of criminality.

The purpose of this document is to consider the crime attribution
characteristics of various IPv6 address assignment techniques.

https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-daveor-ipv6-crime-attribution-00.html


On Sat, Jan 25, 2020 at 7:18 PM Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net> wrote:

> I'm not convinced that I get more privacy by using the privacy addresses
> and more than encoding my emails with rot13.
>
> The industry has far more advanced ways to fingerprint users. The data
> done by https://amiunique.org/ folks as well as others make it clear that
> IP addresses aren't the means of tracking that I believe the concerns that
> introduced privacy addresses were attempting to solve.
>
> Sent from my iCar
>
> On Jan 25, 2020, at 3:53 PM, Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> wrote:
>
> "Using temporary address alone may not be sufficient to prevent all
> forms of tracking. It is however quite clear that some usage of
> temporary addresses is necessary to improve user privacy."
>
> It's intuitive that temporary addresses improve privacy. But the
> question quickly becomes _how_ do temporary addresses improve privacy,
>
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-- 

Gyan  Mishra

Network Engineering & Technology

Verizon

Silver Spring, MD 20904

Phone: 301 502-1347

Email: gyan.s.mishra@verizon.com