Re: Address privacy (was: Re: RFC4941bis: consequences of many addresses for the network)

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Sun, 26 January 2020 17:42 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Address privacy (was: Re: RFC4941bis: consequences of many addresses for the network)
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Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2020 12:42:38 -0500
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Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> wrote:
    >> Except that instead of doing it at layer 4, you do it with IPsec, and extrude
    >> that /128 to your machine.  This is already a thing :-)
    >>
    >> > Another solution I’ve considered is to have a giant anonymity mesh,
    >> > with every ISP’s user participating, and forward flows through this
    >> > mesh, treating each customer as an anonymity server.   I think this is
    >>
    >> This is also a thing called Tor.
    >>
    > Michael,

    > Doesn't that require that the users must explicitly configure when
    > they want privacy? I think a general solution should be transparent to

Yes, I agree, it requires explicit configuration.
I agree that this is not a good thing.

    > the user and "just works" to ensure their privacy. That in fact is one
    > of the arguments for NAT. If there is a significantly large enough
    > pool of users behind a NAT device, then the obfuscation is transparent
    > to the use and seems to be pretty good privacy (good enough that law
    > enforcement is concerned about NAT). I suppose a similar effect could
    > be achieved with a transparent proxy.

Yes, and I think that more and more LEA will grow ever concerned about this
situation, and it *is* pushing IPv6 adoption.  So, how can we find a happy medium?

    > You might want to take a look at draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00.

An interesting read. I'm not sure where it goes.

I would like Locator/Identifier separation.
I wanted SHIM6. LISP would work, I think.
Then privacy needs don't need to screw up efficient routing at the edge.


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-