Re: Address privacy (was: Re: RFC4941bis: consequences of many addresses for the network)

Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Sun, 26 January 2020 19:51 UTC

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From: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2020 11:51:16 -0800
Message-ID: <CALx6S37prWACD0jv9c-XHD-JtPqZAcgeT2Ax0EZHkiQaDR4t=g@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Address privacy (was: Re: RFC4941bis: consequences of many addresses for the network)
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>
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On Sun, Jan 26, 2020 at 9:42 AM Michael Richardson
<mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
>
>
> Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> wrote:
>     >> Except that instead of doing it at layer 4, you do it with IPsec, and extrude
>     >> that /128 to your machine.  This is already a thing :-)
>     >>
>     >> > Another solution I’ve considered is to have a giant anonymity mesh,
>     >> > with every ISP’s user participating, and forward flows through this
>     >> > mesh, treating each customer as an anonymity server.   I think this is
>     >>
>     >> This is also a thing called Tor.
>     >>
>     > Michael,
>
>     > Doesn't that require that the users must explicitly configure when
>     > they want privacy? I think a general solution should be transparent to
>
> Yes, I agree, it requires explicit configuration.
> I agree that this is not a good thing.
>
>     > the user and "just works" to ensure their privacy. That in fact is one
>     > of the arguments for NAT. If there is a significantly large enough
>     > pool of users behind a NAT device, then the obfuscation is transparent
>     > to the use and seems to be pretty good privacy (good enough that law
>     > enforcement is concerned about NAT). I suppose a similar effect could
>     > be achieved with a transparent proxy.
>
> Yes, and I think that more and more LEA will grow ever concerned about this
> situation, and it *is* pushing IPv6 adoption.  So, how can we find a happy medium?
>
>     > You might want to take a look at draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00.
>
> An interesting read. I'm not sure where it goes.
>
> I would like Locator/Identifier separation.
> I wanted SHIM6. LISP would work, I think.
> Then privacy needs don't need to screw up efficient routing at the edge.
>
Hi Michael,

The problem of LISP is that it potentially includes a cache in the
operator network that can be driven by downstream untrusted users--
hence there is possibility of DOS attack on the cache (this is the
primary reason why LISP hasn't been accepted into Linux).

What we really want is Identifier/Locator routing that neither
requires per flow state to be maintained in the network nor relies on
caches to get reasonable performance.
draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy suggests crypto functions to
map identifiers to locators at the edge.

Tom


>
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
>  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>
>
>
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