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Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Tue, 08 March 2011 23:47 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: mrex@sap.com
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Date: Wed, 09 Mar 2011 12:48:47 +1300
Cc: keyassure@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto
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Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:

>The only two situations, where *I* believe that having more than one 
>mandatory to implement hash algorithms for DANE would make sense:
>
> 1)  when SHA-1 was permitted (which no one seems to be asking for)
> 2)  when the SHA-3 winner has been determined (which hasn't happened yet)
>
>Personally, I would strongly prefer the hash algorithm list for DANE to be
>
>   1)   SHA-256      (FIPS 180-3)    MUST implement
>   2)   SHA-512      (FIPS 180-3)    SHOULD implement

+1.

>Personally, I believe that SHA-384, and more so SHA-224 should have never 
>been defined by NIST, because they constantly confuse the crypto-clueless 
>about the purpose of these algorithms and cause needless discussions.

Even more so.

Peter.

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