Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end

Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> Wed, 10 June 2009 00:39 UTC

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Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 09:39:16 +0900
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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To: David Wilson <David.Wilson@isode.com>
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Subject: Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end
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David Wilson wrote:

>>The provision is through hops of certificate authorities,

> As I clearly stated,

As we are discussing on concepts described in two papers, your
own statement without proper quotation from the papers does
not mean anything.

> the actual signing is end to end,

The security hole is located not between certificate authorities
but within certificate authorities.

To quote from the 2001 paper,

	Transactions based on a wellknown public key can be rather
	simple two-party interactions that fit well within the end
	to end paradigm. However, there is a key role for a third
	party, which is to issue a Public Key Certificate and
	manage the stock of such certificates; such parties are
	called certificate authorities.

the first sentence roughly corresponds to your statement "the
actual signing is end to end", however...

And the third parties of certificate authorities constitute
a chain, a channel, hops or whatever terminology you might
use, which is not end to end.

						Masataka Ohta