Re: [Asrg] rDNS
der Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG> Wed, 27 May 2009 20:09 UTC
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Date: Wed, 27 May 2009 15:24:13 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Asrg] rDNS
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> There are different geographic regions and organizations that refuse > to publish reverse DNS. This is true. In my experience being one of them correlates positively, and at least moderately strongly (though of course not perfectly), with being part of the precipitate. Certainly there are clued people, and even small-to-medium organizations, which are for various reasons behind rDNS-free connectivity. IME they are apologetic about it rather than exhibiting the sort of "what do you care about _that_ for, this isn't the '80s, get with it!" attitude that seems (again, IME) to characterize the problematic admins. > As an anti-abuse effort, some providers in North America do not > accept connections without a reverse DNS entry being found. I suspect it's hardly as restricted to North America as you make it sound. > As a result, these providers may be unable to communicate with some > organizations or geographic regions. Right. So? Someone who doesn't tolerate dashes in domain names won't be able to communicate with rodents-montreal.org, either. > Who is wrong, because in the case of email, reverse DNS is clearly > being misused. It's not clear to me that anyone is wrong there, nor that rDNS is being misused. /~\ The ASCII Mouse \ / Ribbon Campaign X Against HTML mouse@rodents-montreal.org / \ Email! 7D C8 61 52 5D E7 2D 39 4E F1 31 3E E8 B3 27 4B
- [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication Mech… Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Dave CROCKER
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Steve Atkins
- [Asrg] 答复: DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Sean Shen
- Re: [Asrg] ´ð¸´: DNS-based Email Sender Authentic… grenville armitage
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] ´ð¸´: DNS-based Email Sender Authentic… Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … John Leslie
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Dave CROCKER
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … John Levine
- [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Email Se… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… SM
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Florian Weimer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS discrimination Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Michael Tüxen
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Bill Manning
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Florian Weimer
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Christian Huitema
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Richard Barnes
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Richard Barnes
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Mark Andrews
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Christian Huitema
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Doug Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Doug Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- [Asrg] RISC is end to end (was Re: DNSSEC is NOT … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely