Re: [DNSOP] HSMs was Re: I-D Action:draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis-01.txt

[Andrew Sullivan <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Apr 21, 2009 at 11:45:18AM -0400, Edward Lewis wrote:
>
> Suppose that I tightly constrain who reads the database.  

Suppose you do.  Then you still have the problem of escalation attacks.  

HSMs are designed to make such attacks impossible: the key simply
won't come out.  That's a better answer than, "I've set it up so that
just about nobody can get to the key", since privilege escalation in
database systems is exactly the place good attackers work.  I notice
in passing that a certain large company who recently bought Sun no
longer makes "unbreakable" claims loudly and in public. 

A


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Andrew Sullivan
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Shinkuro, Inc.