Re: [DNSOP] HSMs was Re: I-D Action:draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis-01.txt

[Edward Lewis <[e-mail]>]

At 13:50 -0400 4/21/09, Paul Wouters wrote:

>No, they just connect to the bogus largebank.com and steal more then 
>your gross
>turnover....

Ummm, psst, most banks here are bankrupt. ;)

>I am tempted to lean towards using a KSK in an HSM, and using the ZSK without

I had the same thought at one point.  But...

As far as an HSM as one way to cover my bases in the event of 
litigation, that goes without question - especially when 
hypothetically speaking.  But pragmatically speaking, I haven't seen 
a "proof" I need an HSM.

Yes, I could use some stress in my life, I hear it's a good way to lose weight.

At 13:59 -0400 4/21/09, Paul Wouters wrote:

>Then you put your vulnerability period during emergency key rollover in the
>hands of the RRSIG lifetime of the parent. That lifetime is probably even
>longer then the time for the attack(er) to make it to CNN's broadcast that
>hopefully warns your custmers.

The problem with revocation in DNSSEC is not limited to issues 
impacted by the choice whether to use an HSM.  E.g., if the HSM uses 
a key that some one else guesses, you have the same problem whether 
you used an HSM or not.  (I guess I suppose it's possible to have key 
dictionary attacks, for example.)

But I suppose that's far flung - I would hope an HSM does a good job 
at randomn number generation.

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Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at [phone]

Getting everything you want is easy if you don't want much.